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THE IDIOM OF SPIRIT: 
DiscouRsE, HuMAN NATURE, AND 
OTHERNESS 
A Response to Philip Clayton and Steven Smith 
Philip Rossi, S. J. 
In a context where key "modern" conceptualities no longer hold un-
contested sway, Philip Clayton and Steven Smith offer us proposals 
for construing" [the] spirit" in categories which they present as both 
philosophically plausible and theologically significant. Although the 
differences between the two papers, both in substance and style, are 
worthy of extended discussion, my comments will focus just on those 
points in which I find them in striking convergence. One reason for 
attending to their convergence is that even though "spirit" has been 
no more than a peripheral topic of discussion in philosophy for much 
of this century, the philosophical landscape has recently seen changes 
and shifts which seem to open space again for a category of spirit. In 
these circumstances, it thus seems that an important initial task for a 
philosophical retrieval of spirit is to locate itself with respect to the 
range of philosophical options currently available. This task of"philo-
sophicallocation" seems especially incumbent, moreover, upon any 
construal of "spirit" that hopes as well to engage the multiple dis-
courses of current theology. This is so because the theological land-
scape has also changed 1-and the transitions which have started to 
become visible in each discipline also affect those parts of the terrain 
of inquiry in which a philosophical articulation of spirit will most 
likely take abode: the often quite precarious terrain where philoso-
phy and theology have variously co-habited, contended, or even at-
tempted co-dominion. 
Within this terrain, there are a number of sites which I see both 
papers identifying as a specific common ground on which a philo-
sophical construal of "spirit" can be located. My comments on the 
common ground staked out by these proposals are offered from a 
perspective which is, in the main, sympathetic to much of what they 
234 Philip Rossi 
ambition with respect to a notion of "spirit." This common ground 
is situated around four coordinates: 
First, in their efforts aim to fashion an idiom of"spirit" that will be 
mutually intelligible in and for philosophical and theological 
discourse ( s); 
Second, in their location of an important part of that intelligibility 
by reference to the dynamics of an embodied, social, and historical 
human existence. Both papers reference their projects-and the cat-
egories to be shaped in it-to the dynamics of an embodied, social, 
and historical human existence; these dynamics attend especially to 
the relational form of human subjectivity and to the relational form-
ing of human intersubjectivity in interaction with a world; I note 
here that this is itself a central part of the contested terrain of the 
modern condominium of philosophy and theology. 
Third, in their taking account of striking contributions (positive 
and negative) made by thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, 
and Levinas to articulating the relational forms of human subjectiv-
ity as a resource for conceptualizing "spirit"; and 
Fourth, in their recognition that, if we are at all to speak philo-
sophically about such matters-about subjectivity, relationality, and 
spirit-we cannot but do so metaphysically, i. e, that our talk about 
such matters requires the systematic articulation of the constitutive 
categories and the fundamental character of what we affirm as real 
and true and good and beautiful. Both papers thus speak in philo-
sophical idioms not so long ago considered part of the "dead" lan-
guage of metaphysics-but both do so, however, aware that the very 
project of metaphysics has been a contested conceptuality, for both 
philosophy and theology, within "modernity", and that it remains all 
the more so in a our so-called "post-modern" context. 
Yet as I try to move with each proposal along the lines they have 
sketched out with respect to these four coordinates, I find myself 
wondering (which, pace Steven Smith, I'll not yet try to claim as an 
authentic motion of "spirit"!) whether these are precisely the direc-
tions along which I would recommend striking out in order to bring 
us closer to places where our contemporary philosophical and theo-
logical conversations could begin to resonate more fully with the lan-
guage [or should it be languages?] of the "spirit." Let me try briefly to 
express what these "wanderings" are as a way to further discussion of 
each proposal. 
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1 . .fu I read both papers, it seems to me that both Smith and Clayton 
acknowledge that, in a world of plural philosophical and theological 
discourse, no single idiom of "spirit" may be mutually intelligible to 
all. As a result, the project of construing spirit philosophically must 
rely on identifYing which forms of discourse and which discourse 
communities it hopes, both now and in the future, the idiom of spirit 
to address. My wondering on this point, however, is not so much 
about which communities of discourse Smith and Clayton seek to 
engage in conversation about the spirit now, but more about how 
they might envision engaging those forms of philosophical (and other) 
discourse and, perhaps even more crucially, those forms of social and 
cultural practice which seem in principle closed to an articulation of 
"spirit" in any idiom. My point of reference here is to the work of 
thinkers such as Charles Taylor, Michael Buckley, Louis Dupre, 
George Steiner and, more radically John Milbank, each of whom has 
delineated ways in which we are situated-indeed ways in which we 
situate ourselves-within a widely pervasive dynamic of modern/post-
modern culture that enables and encourages us to perform, in Taylor's 
words, "spiritual lobotomy" upon ourselves.2 In these circumstances, 
there certainly can be little doubt for many of us that there is need-
even desperate need-for the breath and the utterance of the Holy 
and of the human "spirit." 
But this very possibility that we can be willing, complicit agents of 
the self-stifling of spirit makes me wonder how these proposals could 
be further elaborated with a view to addressing those parts of our 
culture-and thus of ourselves-in which imperviousness to the 
movement of spirit and deafness to spirit's utterance are deeply and 
systematically entrenched: for instance, to addressing spirit-stifling 
practices which seem part of a global, post-industrial, and putatively 
market-driven capitalism. On this point, it seems that Smith's dis-
cussion of the dynamics of "spirit" as rectifYing-especially as a rec-
tifying of relation-and of"attitude [as] ... the location at which the 
required energy and direction for pursuing relationship are either 
present or absent in a subject" (p. 220) might prove to be useful 
starting points for such an elaboration. The direction of such an elabo-
ration, moreover, is one that I hope would enable at least some idiom 
of the spirit-and thus the dynamics of rectifYing spirit-to enter 
into those spheres of wider public discourse which bear upon the 
shaping and the right ordering of a society's relational practices. 
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2. While my first bit of wondering may have more to do with 
matters which the papers do not directly address, my second one has 
to do with matters which they do. It's also not unconnected with my 
first bit of wondering, since it concerns the specific forms of philo-
sophical discourse which both papers do engage. Two of the markers 
of the "spirit discourse" which they propose are the particular refer-
encing of the idiom of "spirit" to the dynamics of an embodied and 
social human existence and, as part of this, to relational forms of 
human subjectivity: it is along these anthropological coordinates which 
they direct us to seek primary resources for fashioning a philosophi-
cally intelligible idiom of"spirit." This idiom, moreover, is polyglot-
by design I suspect-since in it can be discerned accents that are 
postmodern, modern, and premodern as well. It is modern in (among 
other things) its turn to subject and to the anthropological; it is 
postmodern in (among other things) its concrete situatedness and its 
attention to interruption and otherness. It is an idiom, moreover, in 
which a key matrix for the transformative interplay of modern and 
postmodern is found in the intersubjectivity of language. And then 
there are discernable accents of the pre-modern as well, in that these 
proposals each seek a living-or even better, a vivifying link with-
idioms of "spirit" that have been shaped in communities which still 
attend to idiom of spirit as it was given voice in ancient Israel and to 
the echoes, resonances, and transformations of that idiom in the cen-
turies of Christian discourse. 
My wondering here thus concerns the complex interplay-at once 
phenomenological, historical, and systematic-among relationality, 
intersubjectivity, and language which these proposals offer as a dy-
namic for fashioning an appropriate idiom of "spirit." Both papers 
recognize that referencing the idiom of spirit to the relational, inter-
subjective, and linguistic dynamics of our human existence must con-
tend with lines of philosophical thinking that stretch at least as far 
back as Descartes and on their way to us have passed through (among 
other places) Amsterdam, Edinburgh, Konigsberg, Jena, Berlin, 
Copenhagen, Basel, Vienna, Cambridge, Frankfurt and Paris. One 
intriguing sign of this common recognition is the way that Kant and 
Schleiermacher, both historically and systemically, serve as key refer-
ence points in each paper; and even as Clayto-n's paper explicitly situ-
ates itself with respect to a number of particular figures who traced 
these lines, Smith's more allusively casts its argument against the back-
ground of various efforts to grapple with this modern philosophical 
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heritage. Both papers recognize that this heritage is itself contested 
ground and they each seem to have different vantage points upon 
that contestation. But I also think-subject to correction-that both 
papers share one point of consensus that seems to have emerged from 
this heritage: the hesitancy of the modern and post-modern alike to 
speak of the dynamics of human existence (be it of individuals or of 
us in common) in terms of a "human nature." 
I don't propose to argue that the hesitancy is not well-founded: 
there are indeed good historical and conceptual reasons to tread cau-
tiously in the vicinity of a concept-or, I think more accurately, a set 
of concepts-whose significance and function currently elicits little 
consensus even within "regional" circles of philosophical discourse, 
let alone across those circles, and, least of all, in cross-disciplinary 
discourse. My wonder here, then, is not so much about the absence 
of "human nature" as vocabulary entry in the discourse of subjectiv-
ity, intersubjectivity, relationality, and language. My question is rather 
about the syntax governing the use of these terms: how do (or might, 
or ought) we structure our use of the vocabularies of subject, person, 
intersubjectivity, relationality in the absence of reference to a notion 
of human nature which, it seems to me, functioned syntactically to 
place some constraint on what it makes sense to say about who-and 
what-we are, both individually and collectively? This, I think, is 
akin to the questions that Clayton raises on pp. 190-92 of his paper 
about the self-constituting subject-though in his discussion, the 
syntactical constraint on what we may say of the self comes in terms 
of a notion of transcendence. (Though I will not pursue it further 
here, it seems that some of the important relations among these no-
tions of"self/subject," "nature/world" and "transcendence/God" could 
be usefully explored in terms of how they place mutual syntactical 
constraints on one another.) 
3. My third-and final-bit of wondering derives from the second. 
I perceive in the hesitancy to use the vocabulary of"human nature"-
even while acknowledging the need for some kind of counterpart 
syntactical constraint on what we may legitimately say of our 
(inter-)subjectivity-a tension between the "anthropological" and the 
"metaphysical"-and, in the case of Smith's proposal, between these 
two and the "transmetaphysical"-in forging an effective and a per-
suasive contemporary idiom of spirit. The larger context in which I 
would like to place this wonder is not, however, the oft-told (and in 
my judgment, the by-now-tired) story of the con testability of meta-
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physics and the rumors of its death; it is, instead, the shift which 
seems to have taken place in the locus from which metaphysics is 
construed and metaphysical discourse is constructed. This is the shift 
from "thought" and "being" (or, as some might put it, from the "ra-
tional" and the "real") to "language" and "relation"-a shift which, 
though it certainly encompasses the one from "substance" to "sub-
ject," is just as certainly not exhausted by it. This shift, as I see it, is 
not one of replacement, but of what we might call "focal displace-
ment": it is not that the systematic articulation of fundamental con-
stitutive categories for what we affirm as real and true and good and 
beautiful no longer can be referenced to "being" or "thought" and or 
"substance"-but that these earlier focal categories for metaphysical 
discourse now in turn need to be referenced to new and at least equally 
weighty points of focus-" language" and "relation" and, perhaps most 
intriguingly, to "otherness" and "difference." 
My sense is that the idioms of spirit which Clayton and Smith each 
present are fashioned not only in awareness of this shift but as par-
ticipant in it. As in the case of the hesitancy to speak in terms of 
human nature, my concern is not about whether such a shift-and 
making the idiom of spirit participant in that shift-is well founded. 
Modern and post-modern accounts of "the real"-even though they 
may not use that precise term-have made it difficult for to us avoid 
the importance, perhaps even the necessity, of construing it-and 
thus ourselves-in terms oflanguage. As Charles Taylor has pointed 
out: "From where we stand, we are constantly forced to a conception 
of man as a language animal, one who is constituted by language."3 
To this conception of our being constituted as human by language, 
we are increasingly being led to add "and by relation, by difference, 
and by otherness." Though it may very well be a matter of legitimate 
dispute whether we should (or even can) avoid going along the paths 
these notions enable us now to chart, prudence suggests to me that 
we consider ourselves as already moving on them. As a result, I think 
that our concern should be about the role which a (re)new(ed) idiom 
of spirit might play in illuminating where this shift is taking us-or, 
to put it in a different voice-with whether and how the spirit is 
with us as we move along the paths of living which we have already 
started to chart from this shift. 
Response to Clayton and Smith 239 
ENDNOTES 
1The most visible of these shifts has been in the rise of so-called "post-modernist" 
issues and modes of inquiry, but there are others: e. g., the internal and sometime 
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comparison to the hard-nosed and tough-minded conceptual analysis of "real" 
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one-has long been apparent and no single successor option holds sway. 
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down by the giants of neo-orthodoxy, paths have been staked out along almost 
every point on the theological compass. 
2Taylor uses this phrase in Sources of the Self The Making of the Modern Identity, 
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of key elements which motivate his project to retrieve a notion of the spiritual is 
found in his Marianist Award Lecture "A Catholic Modernity" (Dayton: The 
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the roots of the current culture conditions which make possible denial and 
forgetfulness of "spirit" see Michael Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism 
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